A yellow card for the striker : national parliaments and the defeat of EU legislation on the right to strike by COOPER, Ian
0	  	  
A Yellow Card for the Striker: 
National Parliaments And the Defeat of EU Regulation on 
the Right to Strike 
Ian Cooper 
 
In May 2012 national parliaments of the EU issued their first yellow card 
under the Early Warning Mechanism of the Treaty of Lisbon.  A sufficient number of 
them raised objections to a legislative proposal – the Monti II Regulation regarding 
the right to strike – that the Commission was required to review the proposal, which it 
subsequently withdrew.  This outcome was, demonstrably, not a coincidence but the 
product of extensive interparliamentary coordination, enabled by the initiative of one 
determined parliament (Denmark’s Folketing), a well-timed COSAC meeting, and the 
network of national parliament representatives in Brussels.  A dynamic political 
process was set in motion in which a number of parliaments joined the effort to obtain 
a yellow card by, in effect, “voting against” Monti II before the eight-week deadline.  
The episode shows that, despite claims to the contrary, national parliaments have the 
capacity and willingness to use their new powers to exercise a collective influence in 
EU affairs.    
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I.  Introduction:  Harmless Procedure or Lever of Parliamentary Influence? 
 On the evening of 22 May, 2012, the Tweede Kamer, the lower house of the 
Netherlands parliament, adopted a “reasoned opinion” (RO) objecting to a legislative 
proposal of the European Union (EU).  The proposal, known by the nickname Monti 
II, was controversial because it was widely seen as hurting the interests of EU 
workers by limiting their right to strike.  National parliaments had been newly 
empowered, under the Early Warning Mechanism (EWM) established by the Treaty 
of Lisbon, to raise subsidiarity-based objections to EU legislative measures in the first 
eight weeks after they were proposed.  The Tweede Kamer was the last national 
parliamentary chamber to voice its objections to Monti II before the eight-week 
period elapsed, doing so in the waning hours of the final day.  In the end, twelve 
parliamentary chambers – seven unicameral parliaments, plus five single chambers 
from bicameral systems – passed ROs.  This meant that under the rules of the EWM, 
the very first “yellow card” had been triggered.  As a consequence, the institution 
which had proposed Monti II, the Commission, was required to review it, after which 
it had three options:  it could maintain, amend, or withdraw the proposal.  In 
September 2012, the Commission decided to withdraw it.  Thus for the first time, 
national parliaments (NPs) had collectively intervened in the legislative process of the 
EU – to decisive effect.1   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For this article, 31 officials from the parliaments of 17 EU member states – 
including national parliament representatives (NPRs) from 15 parliamentary 
chambers, the Permanent Member of the COSAC Secretariat, and the IPEX 
Information Officer – as well as one European Parliament official and one 
Commission official, answered questions on background between October 2012 – 
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 The occasion of the first yellow card – and the fact that it precipitated the 
withdrawal of the targeted legislation – challenges the commonly held view that the 
EWM is toothless.  Around the time of its inception one scholar judged it to be a 
“rather harmless procedure, with only a marginal impact on the EU’s legislative 
process” (Raunio 2010: 13), and most academic observers who looked at the EWM 
took a similar view (Bellamy and Kröger 2012; De Wilde 2012; Fraga 2005; Kiiver 
2006).  Three kinds of mutually-reinforcing obstacles – logistical problems, incentive 
problems, and weaknesses inherent to the EWM – stood to prevent NPs from using 
the EWM to substantially affect EU legislation (Cooper 2012: 449-451). It was 
widely doubted whether they had either the capacity (given the weakness of 
interparliamentary coordination) or the willingness (given the perceived apathy of a 
majority of NPs) to coordinate their efforts in order to gain sufficient support to 
achieve a yellow card, which – even if obtained – would not constitute a veto of the 
proposal.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
June 2013.  Long interviews in Brussels (26-29 November 2012, 3-7 June 2013), as 
well as by telephone and email, were supplemented by short interviews on the 
margins of plenary COSAC meetings in Nicosia (14-16 October 2012) and Dublin 
(23-25 June 2013).  Two NPRs also shared their contemporaneous notes with the 
author. A number of officials read and gave comments on an earlier draft of this 
paper. In addition, five national MPs, including the Danish and Latvian European 
Affairs Committee (EAC) Chairs, answered questions on the record.  The author 
warmly thanks all interviewees.   
The finding that there was extensive coordination among national parliaments in the 
case of Monti II was also amply confirmed in the COSAC biannual report (COSAC 
2013a: 26-34; for details, see the various answers to Question 4.8 in COSAC 2013b). 
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 This article explains how these various obstacles were overcome in the case of 
the Monti II yellow card, by offering a detailed reconstruction of the events as they 
unfolded between March-May 2012. It is a dramatic story with unexpected twists and 
a nail-biting climax, the outcome of which was uncertain until the very end.  Yet 
while it played out mostly in public view, it is still largely unknown to the public as it 
unfolded not in a single location but in parliaments and committee chambers scattered 
across the capitals of Europe.  Even most of those who were directly involved – of 
which many were interviewed for this article – only know a part of the story and not 
the whole.  This article enables a systematic reassessment of the effectiveness of the 
EWM in light of the experience of the first yellow card, and the scholarly literature 
which had mostly predicted that it would have little impact (see Section II).  After a 
brief review of the Monti II proposal itself (Section III), a process-tracing analysis 
shows how NPs effectively used a number of tools of interparliamentary coordination 
(Section IV) that initiated a dynamic political process in which a number of NPs were 
influenced to pass ROs in the final days before the deadline (Section V).  This 
outcome necessitates a scholarly reassessment of the EWM (Section VI) which, it is 
concluded, represents a new arena for democratic politics in the EU (Section VII). 
 
II.  A “Deviant Case” to Test the Effectiveness of the EWM 
What does the story of Monti II contribute to the debate over whether the 
EWM enhances the influence of national parliaments in EU affairs?  Of course, the 
mere fact that the yellow card happened does not disprove the sceptics, who only 
predicted that such an occurrence would likely be rare, and of little consequence even 
if it does occur (de Wilde 2012;  Raunio 2010).  Indeed, the fact that only one 
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legislative proposal received a yellow card among the hundreds subject to review by 
NPs under the EWM in its first three years of operation (2010-2012) might reasonably 
be taken as evidence that the system has had little impact.3  On the other hand, one 
might infer that the yellow card was not designed to be a routine occurrence but a 
kind of “alarm bell” triggered in unusual circumstances, and therefore even such a 
low number does not disprove the efficacy of the EWM (Cooper 2012).4  Either way, 
Monti II is not a representative case but a deviant case:  its analysis cannot tell us how 
the EWM works in typical circumstances but can give us crucial insight into the 
unusual set of conditions that may result in a yellow card.   
The principal value of a case study of Monti II is that it can test some of the 
predictions made concerning the internal dynamics of the EWM, and tell us under 
what conditions a yellow card is likely in the future.  Most importantly, it can reveal 
the extent of interparliamentary coordination.  If it turns out to have been minimal or 
ineffective in this case, then this lends credence to the sceptical view that if a yellow 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 A second yellow card was reached in October 2013, in response to the proposal to 
create a European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) (COM/2013/0534).  As of mid-
2014, there had not yet been an “orange card,” which requires a majority of votes 
under the EWM. 
4 The EWM could also be effective in the absence of a yellow card, either by 
deterring the Commission from proposing subsidiarity-violating legislation in the first 
place (de Wilde 2012), or by giving NPs influence in the ensuing legislative process 
(Cooper 2013b).  However, neither of these circumstances is relevant in the case of 
Monti II:  the Commission was not deterred from proposing it, but also withdrew it 
before it entered the normal EU legislative process.    
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card occurred it would be, “essentially… a coincidental sum of otherwise unrelated 
events” (Kiiver 2006: 164):  if so, the first yellow card was sui generis.  On the other 
hand, if interparliamentary coordination turns out to have been extensive, and 
instrumental in NPs’ reaching the 18-vote threshold,5 then it is likely that the 
circumstances can be replicated and repeated.  Prior to Monti II there had been three 
proposals which received enough ROs to rise at least halfway to the yellow card 
threshold – proposals concerning seasonal workers (9 votes),6 a common corporate 
tax base (14 votes)7 and border controls (10 votes)8 – so it is not altogether surprising 
that it was eventually reached.  While the subject matter of Monti II was politically 
salient it was not exceptionally controversial:  a legislative proposal in this area had 
long been promised by the Commission, but strong opposition only arose in reaction 
to the actual text of the measure, which was seen as more damaging to workers’ rights 
than had been expected (see Section III). 
Sceptics made three kinds of arguments about the likely ineffectiveness of the 
EWM:  first, NPs generally lack the logistical capacity needed to reach the yellow 
card threshold;  second, they lack a strong incentive to work to obtain a yellow card;  
and third, even if a yellow card were obtained this would not matter, as it would still 
not signify an increase in the influence of NPs on EU affairs.  First, logistically, it is 
difficult for individual parliaments, deliberative institutions with already busy 
schedules, to properly vet large numbers of – often quite technical and complex – EU 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The threshold became 19 votes after the accession of Croatia on 1 July 2013.  
6 COM/2010/0379. See also Cooper (2013b). 
7 COM/2011/0121. 
8 COM/2011/0560. 
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legislative proposals and come to a decision regarding their subsidiarity compliance 
within an eight-week deadline.  Moreover, interparliamentary cooperation is limited 
(Kiiver 2006; Raunio 2010: 7-9), and provides few tools that would enable the 
coordination of a yellow card.  As all parliaments are formal equals, they have no 
“leader” to rally opposition to a given measure.  Moreover, face-to-face meetings 
between parliamentarians from different member states are infrequent:  for example, 
COSAC, a meeting of members of European Affairs Committees (EACs) of all EU 
parliaments, takes place just twice a year.  And while NPs do have tools of 
information exchange (e.g. the IPEX website, and the network of national parliament 
representatives (NPRs) in Brussels), these are quite weak in comparison to, for 
example, those employed by national governments, who have representatives meeting 
on a continuous and permanent basis in the Council and COREPER.   
Second, it is argued that NPs – whether on the level of whole chambers, 
political parties, or individual MPs – have little incentive to invest their limited time 
and resources in participating in the EWM, as it is extremely unlikely to pay off either 
in terms of electoral advantage at the national level or changed policy outcomes at the 
EU level (Raunio 2010).  Moreover there is great variation between NPs in their mode 
of EU scrutiny and their relations with their respective governments, as well as a 
number of other attributes (see Kiiver 2006: 19-22, 138; Kiiver 2012: 48-62) and their 
propensity to involve themselves in the EWM is likely to vary accordingly.   
The lack of incentive seemed borne out by early experience.  Between 2004-
2009, COSAC conducted eight “subsidiarity tests” in which NPs vetted EU proposals 
under conditions intended to simulate the EWM;  this was a useful learning 
experience, but none of the tests reached the yellow card threshold (Kiiver 2012: 91-
92; see also Knutelská 2013).  And in the initial 20 months of the EWM, 10 of the 40 
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parliamentary chambers in the EU issued no ROs at all, and 9 chambers issued only 
one (Bellamy and Kröger 2014).  Between 2010-2012, the 38 parliamentary chambers 
in EU-279 produced a total of 172 ROs, an average of 4.5 reasoned opinions per 
chamber.  However, a majority of the ROs (95, or 55%) emerged from just seven 
particularly prolific chambers – the Swedish Riksdag (34), the Luxembourg Chambre 
des Députés (13), the French Sénat (11), the Polish Sejm (10), the Polish Senate (9), 
the Dutch Tweede Kamer (9) and the UK House of Commons (9) – six of which were 
among the chambers that passed ROs in the case of Monti II.  Most NPs seemed 
largely apathetic to the EWM while the majority of ROs were produced by a handful 
of particularly active chambers:  this meant that, arithmetically, it would be quite 
difficult to reach the threshold for a yellow card (de Wilde 2012: 14). 
  Third, sceptics argued further that even if a yellow card were reached, this 
would not signify that NPs have gained influence, because their position in relation to 
their own governments and EU institutions would be essentially unchanged.  
Regarding domestic government-parliament relations, one argument is that the EWM 
offers a parliament little influence in comparison to that which can be gained by 
effective oversight of its own government’s position in the Council.  Another 
argument, conversely, is that under the EWM a parliament could become a mere tool 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Although the Spanish and Irish parliaments are bicameral, they have joint scrutiny 
systems, and so are counted as unicameral for the purpose of this calculation. These 
figures are drawn from the Commission’s annual reports on relations with national 
parliaments, available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/relations_other/npo/index_en.ht
m>. 
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of its government, who will instruct it to pass ROs against proposals that the 
government opposes.  Regarding EU institutions, it is argued that parliaments gain no 
influence through the EWM because it does not give them a right to actually veto a 
legislative proposal:  a yellow card is merely advisory, leaving it up to the 
Commission to decide whether to maintain, amend or withdraw the proposal;  and 
even in the case of an orange card, if the Commission maintains the proposal then the 
final decision is in the hands of the European Parliament (EP) and the Council.   
These arguments about the EWM will be reassessed in light of the experience 
of the first yellow card, below (Section VI).  It should be emphasized that the 
analytical focus here is on the effectiveness of the EWM:  does it enhance the 
influence of NPs in the politics of the EU?  Limitations of space do not permit 
consideration of related but ancillary questions, such as whether the EWM subverts 
parliamentary democracy in the EU by blurring the existing lines of delegation and 
accountability in which national governments are the sole representatives of the 
member states at the EU level and are in turn responsible to NPs at the national level 
(Cooper 2013a; De Wilde 2012; Fraga 2005; Raunio 2010).  Other omitted questions 
concern the nature of the subsidiarity review under the EWM (Cooper 2006; Fabbrini 
and Granat 2013; Goldoni 2014; Kiiver 2006, 2012):  is it political or legal-technical 
in nature, are NPs appropriate subsidiarity watchdogs, and is it legitimate for them to 
raise essentially political, rather than purely subsidiarity-based, objections to a 
proposal?  Also beyond the scope of this article is the broader question of whether 
NPs constitute a collective entity at the EU level, e.g. a “virtual third chamber” 
(Cooper 2012).  However, as will be seen below, NPs did in some ways act like 
participants in such a chamber, insofar as they coordinated their efforts to gather a 
sufficient number of “votes” to reach the threshold for a yellow card. 
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III. The Proposed Monti II Regulation 
 The Commission formally adopted the Monti II legislative proposal on 21 
March 2012, but the EWM clock began ticking on 27 March, the day that it sent a 
lettre de saisine to NPs officially notifying them that, as the proposal had now been 
transmitted in all official languages, they could address a RO to the EU institutions 
within the subsequent eight-week period.  Under the EWM, two “votes” are allotted 
to the NP of each member state (regardless of population size) – one per chamber in 
bicameral systems, and two for each unicameral parliament – making a total of 54 
votes in EU-27.  There were 13 bicameral parliaments and 14 unicameral parliaments, 
40 chambers in total (although the bicameral chambers in Ireland and Spain exercised 
joint scrutiny).  A yellow card required the passage of ROs by chambers representing 
a minimum of 18 votes, one third of the total, by 22 May.   
Limitations of space do not permit a full summary of the Monti II proposal 
and the NPs’ reasons for opposing it (for contrasting views, see Fabbrini and Granat 
2013; Goldoni 2014).  Its full title is the “Proposal for a Council Regulation on the 
exercise of the right to take collective action within the context of the freedom of 
establishment and the freedom to provide services” (COM/2012/0130).  It is 
nicknamed Monti II because it is in part modelled after the “Monti Regulation” of 
1998.  Its purpose was to reconcile collective action rights (especially the right to 
strike) with the economic freedoms of the internal market, in the wake of two 
controversial 2007 judgements of the ECJ, Viking and Laval (see Blauberger 2012;  
Davies 2008). 
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Unusually, the legal basis of the proposal was the “flexibility clause” (Art. 352 
TFEU) which empowers the EU to take action in a circumstance where it lacks a 
power specified by the Treaty.  This meant that the proposal would require unanimous 
approval in the Council, as well as the approval of the EP.  This was a “special” 
(rather than the “ordinary”) legislative procedure, which meant for NPs that it was 
subject to the yellow card but not the orange card under the EWM.  In addition, many 
thought that it should be subject to heightened scrutiny as it meant that the EU would 
be exercising powers not specified in the treaty;  in fact, post-Lisbon statutes in at 
least two member states (Germany and the UK) required that the approval of any EU 
measure based on the flexibility clause must be authorized by a prior act of 
parliament, or else the government is obliged to vote against it in the Council.   
 As required by the treaty, NPs objected to Monti II on the grounds that it 
violated the principle of subsidiarity, although these objections frequently overlapped 
with broader objections on policy grounds, or to its legal basis.  The most common 
objections were: the legislation is unnecessary because existing national arrangements 
are sufficient to address the problem;  the legislation has no value-added vis-à-vis the 
current legal status quo;  EU intervention in this area might disturb well-functioning 
national arrangements;  and the proposal does not achieve its objectives of clarifying 
the relationship between social rights and economic freedoms or reconciling them in 
practice in cross-border situations.  While the opponents to Monti II within the NPs 
came from across the political spectrum, and many were motivated more by 
protecting national autonomy than workers’ rights per se, there is on balance a 
leftward tilt to the campaign against it.  Broadly, it was a yellow card for – that is to 
say, in defense of – the striker.  
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IV. Tools of Interparliamentary Coordination 
 Any effort to coordinate the various NPs of the EU to act in concert to achieve 
a yellow card is presented with a host of logistical problems.  Each parliament tends 
to work slowly, according to its own timetable, and according to its own unique set of 
procedures.  Ultimately, the decision to pass a RO is a matter for the discretion of 
each parliamentary chamber.  Moreover, as all NPs within the EU are formal equals, 
and all actions by NPs in the EWM are voluntary, a yellow card must be the result of 
a spontaneous, self-organizing, bottom-up process. This said, NPs do have some tools 
of interparliamentary coordination at their disposal which proved useful in this case.  
First of all, it is often the case that one parliamentary chamber will take on the role of 
“initiator” (“leader” is perhaps too strong a word, given that it lacks any power to 
coerce or reward), the first to move to adopt a reasoned opinion and then to encourage 
others to do so.  In the case of Monti II, the initiator was the parliament of Denmark, 
which in turn (as we shall see) made use of the other tools of interparliamentary 
coordination to amplify its influence.  Second, there are various interparliamentary 
meetings which provide important networking opportunities, such as COSAC, the 
twice-yearly gathering of EAC members from all EU parliaments (Knudsen and Carl 
2008).  COSAC has often been derided as a mere talking shop – it has no independent 
decision-making power – but it does provide an opportunity for national 
parliamentarians to meet together on a face-to-face basis, which proved extremely 
valuable in this case.  Third, there is the network of national parliament 
representatives (NPRs):  almost all NPs have civil servants stationed in Brussels as 
permanent representatives (Christiansen et al. 2013), and they played a crucial role in 
coordinating the response to Monti II.  Finally, there is IPEX, an online platform for 
interparliamentary exchange (Knutelská 2013).  This is an indispensable tool for the 
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sharing and public dissemination of information related to parliamentary scrutiny of 
EU matters;  however, IPEX did not play an important instrumental role in 
interparliamentary coordination in the run-up to the yellow card, because it did not 
contain the most up-to-date information about what was going on in each 
parliament.11  That information was in the hands of the NPRs in Brussels. 
 In the case of Monti II, the Danish Folketing played the role of “initiator,” 
acting rapidly to adopt the first RO, based on a conscious decision to try to persuade 
other NPs to do so with the express goal of achieving the first yellow card. In the 
Folketing, scrutiny of EU affairs, including the power to adopt a RO, is centralized in 
the EAC.  When the EAC chair, Eva Kjer Hansen, saw that all parties in the 
committee were opposed to Monti II, she realized that the measure’s odium made it a 
likely target of widespread opposition among NPs, and thus a good candidate for the 
first yellow card under the EWM.12  The Danish EAC expedited its scrutiny of Monti 
II with the intention of using the coming COSAC meeting in Copenhagen to rally 
opposition to the measure.  The EAC initiated scrutiny of Monti II on 21 March, the 
day of its adoption by the Commission, and decided on 23 March to draft a RO.  
Normally, the EAC would consult the relevant sectoral committee (in this case, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 IPEX does have internal forums in which NPs can privately exchange information 
about parliamentary scrutiny.  However, they are not used.  (Interviews with NP 
officials.)  See also criticism of IPEX from Czech, Dutch, and Italian parliaments in 
COSAC (2013b: 73, 116, 238).  All ROs and documents related to the scrutiny of 
Monti II cited in this paper can be accessed from the dedicated page on the IPEX 
website: <http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/dossier/document/COM20120130.do>. 
12 Interview with Eva Kjer Hansen, Danish EAC Chair. 
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Employment Committee) for its opinion on subsidiarity compliance, but this step was 
skipped in order to speed up the process.  The EAC decided unanimously on 20 April 
to adopt a draft RO.  It formally adopted its RO on 3 May, on behalf of the whole 
parliament, and was the first parliamentary chamber to do so. It should be emphasized 
that it was an initiative of the Danish parliament (not the government) to pass a RO in 
opposition to Monti II and encourage other NPs to do likewise.  The Danish 
government had produced an explanatory memorandum that expressed misgivings 
about Monti II on political grounds, but did not allege a subsidiarity breach.  
Moreover, while Denmark was governed by a centre-left coalition with a Social 
Democrat prime minister, the push for a reasoned opinion in the EAC was led by the 
chair, a member of the opposition Liberal (Venstre) party.    
 National parliamentarians were given an opportunity to discuss the Monti II 
proposal in person at the COSAC meeting in Copenhagen, on 22-24 April.  
Fortuitously, this fell right in the middle of the eight-week scrutiny process for Monti 
II and was hosted by the Danish parliament, by virtue of Denmark holding the 
Council presidency in the first half of 2012.  The draft RO that had been adopted by 
the Danish EAC on 20 April was quickly translated into English and circulated to 
other NP delegations in attendance in Copenhagen. The Danish parliament did not use 
its formal agenda-setting powers as chair to put Monti II, or even more general 
subsidiarity issues, onto the public agenda of the Copenhagen COSAC.  Instead, the 
Danish delegation, and the Danish EAC chair in particular, used the occasion to 
informally approach members of other parliaments on the margins of the COSAC 
meeting, and in the meetings of the political groups, to inform them that they would 
be adopting a RO in opposition to Monti II, and to sound out others regarding whether 
they might do the same.  Whether it made a difference that such unofficial advances 
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came from the chair of the meeting is uncertain.  But it is likely that the fact that the 
COSAC meeting took place at all, allowing the participants in the EWM to meet on a 
face-to-face basis, spurred some NPs to pass ROs which they would not have 
otherwise.  For example, at that time (this has since been remedied) the Latvian 
parliament did not have a system in place to review EU legislation for its subsidiarity 
compliance;  when the Danish EAC chair personally approached her Latvian 
counterpart at the Copenhagen meeting to discuss Monti II, this prompted the Latvian 
EAC to put the matter on its agenda, which led to the first-ever RO passed by the 
Latvian parliament.13 Such advances were probably more effective with NPs in which 
the decision to adopt a RO is made by the EAC (e.g. Latvia) than by the sectoral 
committee (e.g. the Belgian Chambre des Représentants), because it is the members 
of the former who generally attend COSAC meetings.   
 The coordinating role of the NPRs was also crucial.  In mid-2012 every NP, 
with the exception of Slovakia, had at least one staff representative to the EU 
institutions in Brussels.  The NPRs all work in close proximity to one another, in a 
suite of offices provided courtesy of the EP.  This group meets on a weekly basis at 
Monday Morning Meetings (MMMs), which are also attended by officers from IPEX 
and COSAC – but not from other EU institutions, unless they are invited for the 
occasion – to discuss internal issues, including matters of subsidiarity control in NPs.  
They are also continuously in contact with one another through a common email list 
and can share documents privately on a common server.  As envoys from the home 
parliament they are primarily conduits of information, telling people back home what 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Interview with Zanda Kalniņa-Lukaševica, Latvian EAC chair; interviews with NP 
officials.  See also COSAC (2013b: 269). 
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is going on in Brussels and vice versa.  But theirs is also an interpretive role, in both 
directions:  they view events in Brussels through a parliamentary lens, reporting back 
home with an eye to what national parliamentarians care about;  and they interpret 
and explain events in their home parliaments for their colleagues in Brussels (Dias 
Pinheiro 2012: p.112-113).  Having this group in place makes it possible for each NP 
to know, in real time, the state of play in other NPs of the subsidiarity review of a 
given proposal.  In the case of Monti II, it was the Danish NPR who notified his 
colleagues at the MMM on 26 March, that his parliament would be closely reviewing 
the proposal for its subsidiarity compliance: once the Danish RO was adopted, he 
created a jointly accessible document on the common server with a box for each NP, 
so that each NPR was prompted to insert current information about the status of Monti 
II in his or her home parliament and update it whenever its status changed.  In this 
way, as the scrutiny process for Monti II unfolded in parliaments across the EU and 
the number of ROs mounted towards the yellow card threshold, the NPRs were able 
to keep an accurate and up-to-date “vote count” under the EWM as the deadline 
approached.14  
 
V. The Timing and Sequence of Reasoned Opinions 
Attention to detail must be paid when reconstructing the process in which 
votes accumulated against the Monti II proposal under the EWM, because each 
parliament has different procedures for adopting a RO, with its own combination of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Interviews with NP officials.  NPs have reported that the NPRs/MMM was the most 
important network/method of information exchange for the scrutiny of Monti II 
(COSAC 2013a: 31). 
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competent bodies – EAC, sectoral committee, and/or plenary – involved in the 
process.  In seven of the twelve chambers (the French Sénat, the Polish Sejm, the UK 
House of Commons, and the unicameral chambers of Luxembourg, Finland, Portugal, 
and Malta), ROs are adopted by the plenary on the recommendation of the EAC, with 
the sectoral committee(s) consulted to varying degrees;  in two chambers (the 
Swedish Riksdag and the Netherlands’ Tweede Kamer) a RO is normally adopted by 
the plenary on the recommendation of the sectoral committee;  in two chambers 
(Denmark and Latvia) the EAC itself adopts the RO;  and in one (the Belgian 
Chambre des Représentants) the sectoral committee does so.  Reconstructing the 
story is further complicated by the fact that, in the case of Monti II, some 
parliamentary chambers deviated from their normal procedures – for example, the 
Tweede Kamer passed a RO in plenary even though the sectoral committee failed to 
recommend one – which attests to the momentum that was building towards a yellow 
card.  In addition, it is important to distinguish between the date on which each 
chamber made the political decision to adopt a RO, and the date of its formal adoption 
(see Table 1).  For example, ROs were formally adopted by the UK House of 
Commons and the French Sénat on 22 May, the final day, but the political decision 
had effectively been made much earlier, and these earlier decisions would have been 
known to other NPs and factored in to the running tally of EWM votes kept by the 
NPRs during the process.15   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Where committee and plenary were both involved, the day of the committee 
meeting is treated here as the date when the political decision to adopt a RO was 
made, in chambers where (a) the decision on Monti II was made by consensus, and/or 
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[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
When the timing and sequence of ROs is reconstructed (see Table 1) a distinct 
pattern emerges.  Whereas those chambers that are among the most “prolific” 
participants in the EWM (having passed 9 or more ROs in the first three years) 
decided to adopt ROs relatively early in the eight-week review period for Monti II, 
those chambers which are among the most “reticent” (having passed 4 or fewer ROs 
in the first three years) adopted theirs relatively late.  After Denmark passed its RO, 
five prolific chambers – the French Sénat, the Swedish Riksdag, the Polish Sejm, the 
UK House of Commons and the Luxembourg Chambre des Députés – moved to adopt 
ROs between late April and mid-May.  (The exception is the Tweede Kamer which, 
for reasons discussed below, was the last chamber to adopt its RO.)  In the French 
Sénat, the EAC unanimously adopted a draft RO quite early, on 25 April;  after the 
sectoral committee took no decision on it, and no party group requested a plenary 
debate, the RO was deemed to be adopted on 22 May.  In the Swedish Riksdag, the 
decision was made in the Labour Market Committee, which decided to draft a RO on 
26 April, which it adopted unanimously on 3 May, and which was formally adopted 
in the plenary on 11 May.  In the UK House of Commons, on 9 May the European 
Scrutiny Committee agreed a detailed report on the proposal, including a draft RO;  
this RO was eventually passed by the plenary on 22 May.  In the Polish Sejm, on 27 
April the EAC found the proposal incompatible with the principle of subsidiarity;  the 
plenary adopted a RO to that effect on 11 May. The Luxembourg Chambre des 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(b) a committee decision whether or not to adopt an RO is rarely or never overturned 
by the plenary. 
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Députés passed a RO by consensus in its Committee on Labour and Employment on 
14 May, and then through the plenary on 15 May.   
Given that these five are among the handful of EU chambers that pass the 
most ROs, it is not altogether surprising that they passed them in the case of Monti II.  
If only these six chambers – the Danish initiator and the five prolific chambers that 
followed – passed ROs, then there would have been just nine votes, half of those 
needed for a yellow card.  What made it possible to reach the threshold of 18 votes 
was the late intervention of five reticent chambers – the parliaments of Finland, 
Portugal, Latvia, Malta, and the Belgian Chambre des Représentants – four of which 
made the political decision to pass a RO only in the final week before the deadline.  It 
is the actions of these five reticent chambers, as well as the Tweede Kamer, which 
deserve closer attention here.  These chambers took their decisions with the 
knowledge that a yellow card was within reach as the deadline was approaching.   
The Finnish Eduskunta takes a particular view of its role in EU-related 
matters.  Generally, the Eduskunta exercises strong and active scrutiny of the Finnish 
government’s conduct of EU policy, but it takes a skeptical view of inter-
parliamentary cooperation and political dialogue with the Commission, which it views 
mostly as a waste of time:  moreover, it takes the view that in the EWM a RO should 
be addressed to subsidiarity as narrowly defined in the treaty, and not as an 
opportunity to comment on the substance of the proposal (Eduskunta 2013).  Yet 
these scruples were put to the test when the Eduskunta was confronted with Monti II, 
which threatened – as in Denmark and Sweden – the model of industrial relations 
common to the Nordic countries, in which arrangements are made at the national 
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level.16 On 8 May, the Labour and Equality Committee of the Eduskunta adopted a 
report recommending a RO on Monti II;  on 11 May, the Grand (European Affairs) 
Committee adopted its report finding Monti II to be in breach of subsidiarity.  Finally, 
the RO was formally adopted in the plenary by unanimity on 15 May.   
 The Portuguese parliament is by far the most prolific parliament in the 
informal political dialogue – it has sent literally hundreds of letters to the Commission 
– but it is relatively reticent in the EWM:  it issued only one RO prior to Monti II.  On 
15 May, the EAC of the Portuguese Assembleia da República proposed a RO finding 
a subsidiarity breach. This was surprising because it seemed to overturn the opinions 
of two sectoral committees, those on Constitutional Affairs and on Social Security 
and Labour, which had previously adopted reports finding that Monti II did not breach 
subsidiarity.  However, the rapporteur in the Committee on Social Security and 
Labour was an opposition Socialist MP, Maria Helena André, who had previously 
been Minister of Labour and, before that, deputy secretary-general of the European 
Trades Unions Congress (ETUC);  her report of 30 April was in fact a guarded 
critique of the proposal, saying that while it goes “in the right direction,” it is 
problematic “in its current form” as it “limits the right to take collective action” 
(p.14).  This provided ammunition for the EAC, which proposed a RO, which was 
adopted by the plenary on 18 May.   
On that same day, four days prior to the deadline, the EAC of the Latvian 
Saeima – which had never before passed a RO – also decided that Monti II was in 
breach of subsidiarity, and passed a RO on behalf of the whole chamber.  As 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 For a comparison of the Nordic parliaments’ approaches to the EU, the EWM and 
Monti II, see Cooper 2015 (forthcoming). 
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mentioned above, this decision was influenced by the personal contact between the 
Danish and Latvian EAC chairs at the Copenhagen COSAC meeting.  In Malta, a 
working group within the House of Representatives found a prima facie breach of 
subsidiarity in the case of Monti II on 8 May.  After a receiving the opinion of an 
outside legal expert and the explanatory memorandum from the Maltese government 
– both of which agreed that the proposal violated subsidiarity – the Foreign and 
European Affairs Committee recommended a RO on 21 May, which received its final, 
formal approval the next day.  As the parliaments of Finland, Portugal, Latvia and 
Malta are all unicameral, their ROs represented two votes apiece towards the yellow 
card, despite the small size of the nations they represent.  In the EWM, Malta’s House 
of Representatives – representing some 400,000 people – has twice as many votes as 
the UK House of Commons on which it is modelled.    
On the morning of the final day, the vote tally stood at 17 certain or near-
certain votes, one vote short of a yellow card.  At this point there was an unexpected 
intervention from the Belgian Chambre des Représentants.17  This chamber has an 
unusual arrangement in which the relevant sectoral committee, rather than the EAC or 
the plenary, may pass a RO on behalf of the whole chamber.  Prior to Monti II, only 
two ROs had been adopted by the Chambre des Représentants, and both of those 
came from a different sectoral committee than the one in this case.  In the Committee 
on Social Affairs, the idea of passing a RO objecting to Monti II was first put forward 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 According to interviews, the action of the Belgian chamber came as a complete 
surprise to the other NPRs in Brussels.  Ironically, they were better informed about 
events in Lisbon, Riga, and Valletta than about the plans for a last-minute RO being 
prepared just across town in the Belgian parliament. 
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by an opposition Green MP, Zoé Genot.  Yet when the Committee met on 22 May, it 
was another MP, Myriam Vanlerberghe from the governing Flemish Socialist Party, 
who arrived with the text for a RO, already approved by six committee members from 
the six governing parties. (The Minister for Employment, also a Flemish Socialist, 
had already made known that she opposed Monti II;  the text of the RO echoed many 
of the points made by the minister in her letter to the committee.) She explained to her 
colleagues the significance of the vote under the EWM, and the possibility of a yellow 
card.  This RO was adopted by the committee at about 3 pm on 22 May, bringing the 
total number of votes in the EWM to 18, the threshold for a yellow card.  
 In the Tweede Kamer, the decision whether to recommend a RO on Monti II, 
which normally would have been taken in the relevant sectoral committee, was 
delayed by the fall of the government on 21 April.  It was not until 15 May that the 
Social Affairs and Employment Committee finally met for a vote on Monti II, which 
failed to muster a majority in favour of a RO.  While that normally would have put 
the issue to rest, it was revived when the necessary 30 votes were gathered to put the 
question on the agenda of the plenary, scheduled for 22 May.  The debate took place 
in the evening, around 7:15 pm;  the assembled members knew of the Belgian RO and 
that the vote total was very close to the yellow card threshold (the exact number was 
still uncertain, as not all ROs had been uploaded to the IPEX website).  The Minister 
for Social Affairs and Employment was actually present in the chamber, voicing the 
government’s opinion that a RO was unnecessary because Monti II would be more 
appropriately addressed later, when it comes up in the Council.  Despite this, the 
parties of the right and left joined to vote in favour of a RO, so in the end the plenary 
vote was unanimous.  This was the first time that the plenary had, in effect, 
overturned the subsidiarity decision of a committee. With just a few hours to spare, 
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the last – as it turned out, the nineteenth – vote was cast in the EWM, and the yellow 
card was passed.18     
   
VI.  Revisiting the Previous Arguments About the EWM 
We are now in a position to revisit the above arguments about the 
effectiveness of the EWM (see Section II) in light of the experience of the Monti II 
yellow card.  First, and most obviously, the experience shows that NPs, individually, 
have the logistical capacity to pass the required number of ROs within the eight-week 
deadline – albeit just in the nick of time.  This reflects the fact that, individually, NPs 
have generally adapted their internal workings to meet the demands of the new 
procedures introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon.  Notably, at least one chamber, the 
Belgian Senate, seriously considered passing a RO but could not organize a plenary 
vote before the deadline, and one other, the Czech Senate, passed one after the 
deadline had passed, which did not count towards the yellow card;  this suggests that 
the vote count would have been higher if the review period were longer.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 From the point of view of each chamber, its vote is cast at the moment when the 
RO is formally approved according to its own internal rules.  Yet for it to be fully 
official, and known to the wider world, it must be transmitted by parliamentary 
officials to the Commission and uploaded to IPEX.  In fact, six ROs were uploaded to 
IPEX in the final 24 hours.  While the Tweede Kamer was the final vote in the EWM, 
it was not the last RO to come in – that was the UK House of Commons.  The IPEX 
Information Officer was in the office until midnight that night to see that the last ROs 
came in before the deadline. (Interviews with NP officials.) 
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More importantly, the experience shows that NPs as a group have logistical 
tools with which to coordinate their efforts to achieve a yellow card.  Early in the 
process, one chamber can act as an “initiator” by being the first to identify a proposal 
as problematic and pass a RO against it, thereby alerting other NPs and encouraging 
them to do the same.  In the middle of the process, an interparliamentary meeting can 
facilitate an exchange of views on the substance of the proposal and spread awareness 
of the extent of opposition to it among NPs.  And towards the end, the network of 
NPRs can provide NPs with timely information about the “vote count” that can 
influence their decision on whether to adopt a RO before the deadline.  Certainly, all 
these elements came together to facilitate the Monti II yellow card, but that is not an 
entirely improbable confluence of events.  First, it is not uncommon for one chamber 
or another to step forward as “initiator,” leading opposition to a given legislative 
proposal.19  Second, while the timing of the COSAC meeting in the April 2012 was 
fortuitous, interparliamentary meetings are becoming more frequent, creating 
opportunities for informal networking as occurred in the case of Monti II.  For 
example, before 2012 there was only one major twice-yearly interparliamentary 
conference – i.e. COSAC (created in 1989) – but now there are three, after the 
creation of the Interparliamentary Conference on CFSP-CSDP in 2012, and the 
“Article 13” Conference on Economic Governance in 2013.20  Third and finally, the 
network of NPRs is now a permanent feature of the interparliamentary landscape that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Interviews with NP officials. 
20 See Cooper 2014.  At the first “Article 13” Conference in Vilnius in October 2013, 
the author observed representatives from the Tweede Kamer lobbying other 
parliaments to pass ROs against the EPPO proposal, with the explicit aim of 
achieving a second yellow card. 
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will continue to facilitate information-sharing among NPs as they interact under the 
EWM.     
Second, regarding incentives, close process-tracing of the Monti II experience 
shows that, whatever their reasons, many individual parliamentarians do, as a matter 
of observable fact, involve themselves in the EWM.  In many chambers it was the 
advocacy of a single MP – often one who had previously worked in proximity to EU 
institutions – that succeeded in putting the question on the parliament’s agenda and/or 
pushing through a RO.  For example, the Danish EAC chair, Eva Kjer Hansen, 
formerly an MEP, succeeded in gathering support for the yellow card not only within 
her own chamber but in other parliaments as well.21  Her example challenges the 
assertion that, “As for policy influence, the ability of an individual legislator to 
influence politics at the European level is probably close to zero, including under the 
early-warning mechanism” (Raunio 2010:10).   
While most NPs seemed to lack interest in the EWM during the COSAC tests 
and in the early period after it was first launched, this is belied by the fact that their 
scrutiny activities, including the number of ROs produced, has increased steadily 
since its establishment.22  The COSAC tests were a hypothetical exercise undertaken 
before the Treaty of Lisbon became law, about which Knutelská (2013: 47) astutely 
observed that “...the best incentive for interparliamentary cooperation is the 
introduction of actual competencies at the European level.”  In a similar way, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 For examples of how the Danish Folketing has long acted as a political 
entrepreneur of interparliamentary cooperation, see Cooper 2015 (forthcoming). 
22 The total numbers of ROs in each of the first four years of the EWM were 36 
(2010), 65 (2011), 71 (2012), and 88 (2013).  
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prospect of actually reaching the yellow card threshold can change the incentive for 
fence-sitting parliaments, since they see that they may contribute to a successful 
outcome;  indeed, this dynamic appears to be part of the reason for the late surge in 
ROs in the case of Monti II.  While it is true that only seven prolific chambers 
produce the majority the ROs under the EWM – and six of these passed ROs in the 
case of Monti II – a political dynamic may develop in which the more reticent 
chambers may be persuaded to pass ROs if they see a yellow card is within reach.  
Third, what of the claim that even if a yellow card is passed this does not 
really enhance the influence of NPs over EU affairs, either vis-à-vis their own 
governments or in relation to EU institutions?  Against the argument that NPs should 
focus on scrutiny/control at the national level rather than engaging at the EU level 
through the EWM, the case of Monti II shows that there need not be a tradeoff 
between these roles, but they are in fact largely complementary.  Most parliamentary 
chambers that passed a RO were in effect also instructing their government to oppose 
Monti II, at least as it was originally proposed, and in some cases these instructions 
would probably be considered binding, whether politically (e.g. in the Nordic states) 
or legally (e.g., in the UK, due to the use of the flexibility clause).  Conversely, there 
is little evidence that parliaments were merely tools of their governments:  in almost 
every chamber that passed a RO – with possible exception of the Belgian Chambre 
des Représentants – the impetus came from the parliament, not the government.23  As 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 However, in Spain, the government may have influenced the decision not to pass a 
RO.  There, an opposition Socialist MP, Ramón Jáuregui, drafted a RO objecting to 
Monti II, but it was voted down in the EAC by the right-leaning parties of 
government. (Interview with NP official.) 
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Monti II would have required unanimity in the Council (see Section III), each 
government effectively had a veto over the legislation, and thus did not need the help 
of its parliament to block the proposal.  While the policy preferences of government 
and parliament were almost always closely aligned – in opposition to Monti II – they 
did not always agree tactically on whether to use the EWM to advance those 
preferences.  In three countries – Denmark, the UK, and the Netherlands – the 
government took the view that the proposal was problematic on substantive grounds 
but did not violate the principle of subsidiarity;  indeed, in the Netherlands, the 
government minister continued to argue against a RO in the final debate in the 
Tweede Kamer before it was adopted.  In at least two countries, Malta and Latvia, the 
government did not take a position on the legislation until the parliament asked for it;  
in these cases, the government effectively went along with the parliament’s opinion.  
The very earliness of the EWM requires parliaments to publicly give their opinion on 
a legislative measure, often before their respective governments have determined their 
position on the proposal.    
Finally, sceptics argue that NPs have gained little or no influence because final 
decisions over EU legislation remain in the hands of the Commission, Council and 
EP.  Indeed, the first yellow card, issued in May 2012, was merely advisory, only 
requiring that the Commission review Monti II, after which it could have amended it 
or maintained it unchanged.  In the event, the Commission withdrew the proposal in 
September 2012, but in a manner that seemed to minimize the role of NPs, insisting 
that Monti II was in compliance with the principle of subsidiarity but was being 
withdrawn because it “…is unlikely to gather the necessary political support within 
the European Parliament and Council to enable its adoption.”  The latter point is 
certainly true.  In the Council, it is very unlikely that Monti II would have gained the 
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necessary unanimous approval, given that a number of national ministers of 
Employment and Social Affairs had expressed preliminary misgivings about the 
proposal as early as 25 April, when it was discussed informally in the relevant 
Council group (EPSCO).  Moreover, in the EP, where majority approval would have 
been required, opposition spread to the point that in July a number of leaders of EP 
party groups took the very unusual step of writing to the Commission to insist that 
Monti II should be withdrawn,24 and indeed, its eventual withdrawal was welcomed 
both on the left (S&D25, Greens26) and the right (EPP27, ECR28).  From this 
perspective, Monti II was doomed with or without a yellow card. 
So did the yellow card even matter?  Ultimately, opposition to Monti II 
became so widespread that its failure was overdetermined, i.e. an effect with multiple 
causes, any one of which could have been determinative.  Yet even if the yellow card 
was not the fundamental cause of the demise of Monti II, it was the proximate cause, 
in that it influenced the timing of the decision to withdraw.29  The yellow card forced 
the hand of the Commission, requiring it to make a positive decision about the fate of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Interview with Commission official. 
25 Available at:  <http://www.socialistsanddemocrats.eu/newsroom/monti-ii-dropped-
–-sd-meps-will-keep-fighting-social-rights#1>. 
26 Available at:  <http://www.greens-efa.eu/right-to-strike-7988.html>. 
27 Available at:  
<http://www.eppgroup.eu/press/showpr.asp?prcontroldoctypeid=1&prcontrolid=1138
4&prcontentid=18976&prcontentlg=en>. 
28 Available at:  <http://ecrgroup.eu/?p=7038>. 
29 Interview with Commission official. 
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the proposal.  Even if it stood little chance of final passage, the proposal could have 
languished in legislative limbo indefinitely in the absence of a yellow card.  Thus it 
may be said with certainty that NPs precipitated the demise of the legislation.   
 
VII. Conclusion: An “Isoglucose Moment” for National Parliaments? 
With the passage of the first yellow card, and the subsequent withdrawal of 
the targeted legislation, the NPs have shown themselves to be a collective force in EU 
politics.  While they do not, as a group, have the power to veto an EU proposal, they 
can intervene in the EU legislative process in a way that gives them influence over the 
final outcome.  In historical perspective, their common position is in some ways 
comparable to that of the EP in the 1980s – for example after the 1980 Isoglucose 
ruling, the upshot of which was that the other EU institutions could no longer simply 
ignore the EP’s opinion on proposed EU legislation.30  While the circumstances are 
not identical, the Monti II yellow card presents a similar historical moment, in that it 
represents the first time that NPs asserted themselves in the EU legislative process in 
a way that the EU institutions could not ignore.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 In Isoglucose, the European Court of Justice ruled that the Council must await the 
opinion of the EP before adopting legislation under the “consultation” procedure.  In 
fact, a closer (but less famous) historical analogue to the first yellow card was the 
Benzene Directive (1988), which was the first legislative proposal to fail partly due to 
the opposition of the EP which, under the “cooperation” procedure, had influence 
over legislation but not an outright veto (Corbett et al. 2011: 258-264).  On the 
analogy between the “cooperation” procedure and the EWM, see Cooper (2012: 448-
449). 
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The EWM was originally devised by the European Convention with a dual 
purpose, not only to introduce a new subsidiarity check on proposed legislation, but 
also to give NPs a greater say in the affairs of the EU in the hope that this would 
diminish the democratic deficit (Cooper 2006).  It would be premature to draw, from 
a single case, conclusions as to whether the latter goal is being achieved.  Moreover, 
considering that only a minority of chambers passed ROs, the yellow card does not 
prove that NPs are a collective actor at the EU level.  However, many NPs did at least 
act like participants in a “virtual third chamber” (Cooper 2012) in the following way: 
they monitored and influenced one another as they decided how to cast their “votes” 
within a political procedure oriented towards reaching a voting threshold that, when 
reached, had legislative consequences.  In conclusion, on the evidence of the first 
yellow card, the EWM is not primarily a legal or technical exercise.  Rather, it is new 
arena for democratic politics in the EU.  
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Table 1. Timing and sequence of political and formal decisions to adopt ROs on 
Monti II (2012), and total ROs produced by each chamber between 2010-2012.   
Parliament/ Chamber Political Decision to 
Adopt RO  
Cumulative 
Vote Total 
Formal Adoption 
of RO 
Total ROs  
2010-2012 
Denmark 20 April 2 3 May 6 
French Sénat 25 April 3 22 May 11 
Sweden 3 May 5 11 May 34 
UK House of Commons  9 May 6 22 May 9 
Polish Sejm 11 May 7 11 May 10 
Finland 11 May 9 15 May 2 
Luxembourg 14 May 11 15 May 13 
Portugal 15 May 13 18 May 2 
Latvia 18 May 15 21 May 1 
Malta 21 May 17 22 May 3 
Belgian Chambre des Reps. 22 May 18 22 May 4 
Netherlands Tweede Kamer 22 May 19 22 May 9 
 
 
